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The Other Arms Race: The
Liquid Metal Fast Breeder
Reactor and the Plutonium
Safeguards Problem
The development of breeder reac-
tors that produce more fuel than they
consume should be accelerated as a
means of reducing the costs and
hazards of nuclear power.
-Southern Gover-
nor's Task Force
for Nuclear Power 1
The plutonium breeder reactor is a
government financed moloch,
plagued by catastrophic dangers,
massive cost overruns and
questionable economic value, which
the government technocrats are
building for the private
utilities
. . . .lemon socialism.
-Ralph Nader 2
Since its inception^ontroversy has surrounded the
development of the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor
(LMFBR) program. Why? The LMFBR presents
significantly higher risks than the current generation
of conventional Light Water Reactors (LWR), due
mainly to the safeguards problems associated with
the breeder'splutoniumfuel cycle. Plutonium creates
hazards to human welfare for several reasons. It is an
extremely toxic substance. Furthermore, it is relative-
ly easy to construct a nuclear bomb out of an quantity
of plutonium the size of a softball and small amounts
of plutonium can be used directly as radiation disper-
sal weapons. These potential dangers are accen-
tuated by the breeder fuel cycle, which requires large
amounts of cross-country transportation of nuclear
materials. Shipments in transit are especially
vulnerable to theft and sabotaged induced disasters.
Nuclear black markets for terrorists and hostile
governments may develop.
In the midst of this controversy, the LMFBR has
been given the highest priority in recent federal
energy expenditures. During fiscal year 1 973, out of
the total energy research and development budget of
0.7 billion dollars, the breeder received 0.3 billion
dollars and "other nuclear" was allocated 0.2 billion
dollars. 3 Through 1974, the LMFBR has consumed
1.8 billion dollars, and the Energy Research and
Development administration (ERDA) conservatively
estimates an additional 8.9 billion dollars, (omitting
operating subsidies to early commercial breeders and
private capital) will be needed to bring the project to
fruition. ERDA hopes the first commercial models will
be available in 1 987 and "optimistically" projects 1 86
operative LMFBR's by the year 2000. 4
Why has the breeder reactor been emphasized?
Proponents cite national security, lower long-run
energy generation costs, and a somewhat lower ther-
mal pollution capacity. It is true that the breeder
technology offers an advantage in meeting a short-
term energy independence goal because of the
relative scarcity of uranium 235 for the LWR. Dale
has shown that "taken by itself, U-235 makes only a
minimal contribution to overcoming oil scarcity." 5
Only 0.7 percent of mined uranium is in the U-235
form; most is U-238 which cannot be used in the LWR
but can be converted into plutonium 239 for use as
LMFBR fuel. In addition, the breeder reactor actually
produces more fissile Pu-239 than it consumes.
Nevertheless, the relevant questions are whether
health and safety standards will be constraining fac-
tors and whether solar power, fusion, or alternate
nuclear cycles might be more economical alter-
natives when all the costs are included.
Opponents of the LMFBR have produced counter-
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The breeder produces more plutonium than it con-
sumes out of non-fissionable uranium 238.
Source: General Electric,
native"
"Our Only Reasonable Alter-
studies showing the breeder cannot be justified from
an economic point of view when more conservative
assumptions of future energy demand, uranium
supply, the rate of time discount, and the date of com-
mercial introduction are made. 6
However, the LMFBR does not produce higher
levels of routine radiation emissions than conven-
tional reactors, and under ordinary conditions, these
levels will be below natural background concen-
trations. Core Disassembly Accidents are no more
likely for the LMFBR than the LWR. There is,though,
one area of additional hazard for the LMFBR fuel cy-
cle. A National Science Foundation survey of scien-
tists pinpointed a high degree of concern over nuclear
material safeguards. This is where the breeder
carries extra risks. 7 Nobel laureates line up on both
sides of nuclear power issues. The average citizen is
not sufficiently informed.
The purpose of this study is to examine the
safeguard risks associated with the breeder reactor.
First, the safeguard problem is defined. The
safeguard risks of the breeder reactor are compared
in relation to the other types of nuclear reactors con-
sidered for use in the United States. (These reactors
operate on different fuel cycles and safeguard risks
depend on the fuel cycle. )This isfollowed by a discus-
sion of the safeguard risks, and the methods and
costs of assembling a safeguards system. The article
concludes by emphasizing the conflicting array of
opinions and policy implications for the breeder
program.
The Safeguards Problem
Safeguard risks are narrowly defined as one subset
of nuclear power safety risks. Safeguard risks are
man-made in origin; they include nuclear theft and
subsequent use of Strategic Nuclear Material* (SNMj
for bombs or radiological dispersal weapons as well
as acts of sabotage which may induce accidents in
operation or transportation. ERDA's second en-
vironmental impact statement on the breeder
program discusses the safeguards issue but does
"not attempt to quantify the risk on the rationale that
the frequency of such occurrences cannot now be es-
timated." 8 Uncertainty is large because society isfac-
ing a new problem and firm safeguard methods and
policies have not yet been established.
Plutonium and Radiation Risks
Even though safeguard risks have not been quan-
tified, they are real, and could prove damaging to
human welfare. There are four broad categories of
radiation danger: somatic, genetic, teratogenic, and
carcinogenic. It must be emphasized that the effect of
radiation is cumulative; the total body burden is im-
portant.
Somatic effects refer to physical damage to body
cells and tissues. The immediate result of exposure of
human tissue to radiation is the removal of electrons
which are then free to ionize other molecules.
Chemical bonds split and cell structures become dis-
organized. Plutonium 239, the primary fuel used in
the LMFBR, is a heavy emitter of alpha particles
which cannot pentrate through the skin. Inhalation is
the primary mode of contact because most forms of
plutonium are relatively insoluble. This does not
mean that somatic effects are confined to the
respiratory system because the lymphatic and cir-
culatory systems transport the dose throughout the
body. Much of the non-lung body burden of plutonium
is stored in the skeletal system. Possible results of
somatic damage are death, growth impairment, men-
tal retardation, cataracts, and sterilization.
However, the immediate somatic effects of
plutonium exposures may be the least important. A
dose may have deadly future ramifications to the ex-
posed individual and to future generations According
to Russell, a dose of sixty rads* per generation f 30
years) delivered continuously would double the muta-
tion rate. 9 The United Nations Scientific Committee
on Effects of Atmospheric Radiation suggests that
there is no threshold for genetic effects and "the fre-
quency of mutation is proportional to dose, but is not
independent of dose rate." 10 Genes have somatic im-
plications as well. Lederberg, a Nobel laureate in
Genetics, writes, "It is generally accepted that there
is a genetic component in much, if notall disease." 11
Radiation is also teratogenic; it has the ability to
cause birth defects.
* Strategic Nuclear Material consists of material that
can be fabricated into a fission bomb. A strategic
quantity is the amount ofmaterial needed for the con-
struction of one bomb. Substrategic quantities of
plutonium are also dangerous due to its toxicity.
**The rad is a dose corresponding to the absorption of
one hundred ergs of energy per gram ofbody tissue.
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Afourth possible result of radiation exposure is car-
cinogenesis. The exact process of how injury initiates
cancer is not known and there are long and variable
periods. One ten millionth of an ounce of plutonium
injected subcutaneously in dogs produces bone
cancer. 12 The National Academy of Sciences Com-
mission on Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation
(BEIR) estimates the lung cancer riskatl .3 x 10" 6 per
year-man-rem* for adults. 13
Gofman and Tamplin take a more extreme view.
They claim the cancer risk factor is 1800 times
greater than the BEIR estimate. "If the average ex-
posure of the U.S. population were to reach the
allowable 0.1 7 rads per year average, there would, in
time, be an excess of 32,000 cases of fatal cancer
plus leukemia per year, and this would occur year
after year." 14
Plutonium may also present special dangers. The
International Commission on Radiological Protection
has warned that, "In terms of amount available, pro-
jected usage, extent of anticipated accidental human
exposure andradiotoxicity, plutonium is the most for
-
"Terrorists frequently attack their
single-minded goals with fanaticism
and ruthlessness."
midable radionuclide in the periodic table." 15
Plutonium burns spontaneously when exposed to
air, forming intense insoluble plutonium dioxide par-
ticles. One ounce of plutonium can yield 10 trillion
small aerosols which may be suspended in the at-
mosphere. Some scientists have reported that
plutonium emits a special type of alpha particle
known as a "hot particle" because of its intensity and
small size. These small radioactive aerosols may
penetrate deeper into air sacs and remain embedded
in respiratory tissues. It has also been suggested that
"Energy dissipated in a limited volume may be far
more carcinogenic than if the same type of radiation
were to dissipate its energy over a much larger
mass." 16 According to Geesaman, plutonium "hot
particles" pose a carcinogenic risk between 100 and
10,000 times greater than the National Commission
on Radiological Protection (NCRP) calculation. The
British Medical Research Council and the U.S. NCRP
have rejected the "hot particle" hypothesis as un-
founded. ERDA has not taken a formal stand on the
matter, awaiting the results of a study to be com-
pleted in 1985. Hardly anything is known about the
total long-run effects of radiation in the biosphere.
Nuclear Terrorism and Theft
Radiation could be released from a variety of
terrorist activities following a theft of nuclear
materials. Terrorists frequently attack their single-
minded goals with fanaticism and ruthlessness.
Westinghouse Corporation "clearly recognizes that
the threat of exposure, hijacking, and theft increases
as more light water and breeder reactors are placed in
service." However, Westinghouse does not ap-
preciate the nature of a terrorist when it claims that
"spent fuel has too high a level of penetrating radia-
tion to be a target of theft or diversion." 17 Terrorists
have been known to take health risks and often wish
to die as martyrs to their cause. Hostile governments
may also be a threat.
What are the risks of nuclear theft? Opinion varies.
The impact statement prepared by ERDA states that
"to obtain significant quantities, a large number of
thefts must be committed with a concomitant high
risk of detection." 18 Former Congressman Hosmer, a
nuclear power advocate and ally of the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), warns that, "Liberating a half
gram of plutonium at a time might be so small an
amount as to be relatively undetectable even by the
best black boxes and the sharpest eyed inspectors." 19
Where is nuclear theft most likely to occur? Fresh
fuel assemblies are prime targets because they con-
tain SNM in large quantities and are pre-packaged for
safe handling. Also, there are fewer physical barriers
to cross in transit than at a nuclear facility. Willrich
and Taylor downgrade the possibility of plutonium
theft in stages when it ismixed with intensely gamma
radioactive products. The most susceptible areas are
then
. . .
the output of reprocessing
plants, plutonium storage facilities,
fuel fabrication plants, fresh fuel
storage facilities, and the transporta-
tion links
. . . Among these the
places that would be most vulnerable
to attempted thefts would be the
plutonium load-out rooms at
reprocessing plants where an
employee might pour out very small
quantities of plutonium nitrate into a
container for surreptitious removal;
or at fuel fabrication plants, where an
employee might steal a few fuel
pellets or a plutonium-bearing fuel
rod or fuel pin. 20
What will happen to stolen plutonium? Employee-
related thefts will probably enter a black market since
employees with clearances are rarely members of
subversive organizations. Hijacked-transportation-
related thefts are probably placed directly in the
hands of terrorists or organized crime. The profit
potential is tremendous. Plutonium is valuable as a
legitimate fuel source. One kilogram "can produce as
much energy in a power station as 1,700 tonnes**of
oil." 21 Its black market value will be much higher as
*The estimated biological effect of a radiation dose is
measured by the rem. For example, a dose ofO. 7 rad
from neutrons or high energyprotons is approximate-
ly equal to one rem. One rem is also equivalent, rou-
ghly, to one rad ofX-Ray or beta radiation and a mere
0.05 rad from particles heavier than protons.
**One metric tonne equals WOO kilograms or 2200
pounds.
25
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an instrument of death and destruction capable of
bringing about land conquest, religious, racial, or
national genocide, coups d'etat, and international in-
come redistribution. In 1970, a fourteen year-old
honor student in Orlando, Florida bluffed a nuclear
bomb threat and almost succeeded in gaining one
million dollars of ransom money.
Taylor, in congressional testimony, insisted that
present safeguards are "not adequate to prevent theft
by heavily armed groups with resources and motiva-
tion comparable to the Brinks gang and other groups
of professional criminals". 22
Three Nuclear Fuel Cycles
In order to evaluate the likelihood and places of
origin of potential safeguard risks in the breeder reac-
tor, an examination of its nuclear fuel cycle is crucial.
Determining the relative risks involved requires a
comparison with the two other majortypesof nuclear
reactors. The three types of fission reactors con-
sidered serious contenders in the upcoming U.S.
energy picture are the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder
Reactor (LMFBR), the conventional Light Water Reac-
tor (LWR), and the High Temperature Gas Reactor
(HTGR). Each operates on a different nuclear fuel
system.
The LMFBR* releases energy as it converts
uranium 238 topi utonium 239. Occasionally, Pu-239
captures an extra neutron without undergoing fis-
sion. The product, plutonium 240 poisons chain reac-
tions in the reactor. Therefore, when the 240 isotope
content builds up to 10 percent to 20 percent of the
total plutonium content, the fuel rods have to be
removed. Atthat time, there isalso more Pu-239than
existed originally in the fuel assembly. Economic fac-
tors encourage separation of the Pu-239 from the Pu-
240 and subsequent reprocessing for re-use as fuel
for either the LMFBR or the LWR. After reprocessing,
the material is then transported to a fuel fabrication
plant. From there, it is ready to be sent to a reactor.
Plutonium 239 poses most of the safeguard
problems because it can be used to construct a
nuclear bomb. The 240 isotope is useless to potential
bomb makers. However, both isotopes are strong
alpha emitters and can be used in radiological disper-
sal weapons. Large quantities of plutonium 239 are
available in forms relatively safe to handle after
reprocessing up until the new fuel rods are inserted
into a reactor core. Spent fuel rods** are less of a
problem since detection and recovery is simplified.
(The gamma radioactive fission products can be more
easily identified by Geiger counters.) The size of the
nuclear material flows is indicated by the example of
the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. This small govern-
ment demonstration LMFBR located in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee will require 20 tons of plutonium and 210
tons of uranium during its 30-year plant life. One
third of the fuel core will be replaced annually. 23
The current generation of nuclear power plants, the
LWR, splits uranium 235. During the process, some
plutonium is produced as a by-product. Since it is
possible for an LWR to operate on recycled plutonium
when certain modifications in plant design are made,
spent LWR fuel may also be shipped across country to
*The term "liquid metal" refers to the sodium coolant
in the breeder reactor; the nuclear material is in the
solid form.
*
*Spent fuel is the depleted nuclear material left over
after fission.
The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) Fuel Cycle
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Reprinted with permission from NUCLEAR THEFT Risks and
Safeguards by Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor,
Copyright 1973, Ballinger Publishing Company.
capital-intensive reprocessing facilities.* The
magnitude of safeguard risks is much lower in the
LWR than in the LMFBR for several reasons. First, the
LMFBR involves approximately six times as much
plutonium overall and two to three times as much in
fresh fuel assemblies, when compared to the LWR
with plutonium recycling. 24 Second, LWR fuel rods
are much less concentrated than the LMFBR rods. A
thief would need only 50 to 100 kilograms of rods to
be able to build a bomb from LMFBR fuel rods at this
stage. 25 The uranium in LWR fuel requires extensive
processing before it can be used in a bomb and much
more material must be stolen to acquire enough
plutonium for a bomb.
The third major nuclear reactor type, the HTGR,
converts relatively abundant thorium 232 to uranium
233. Like the LWR, the HTGR is not a breeder,
although the HTGR has a higher efficiency and may
be a partial solution to the problem of U-235 scarcity.
After fabrication into fuel particles, the HTGR fuel is
relatively dilute and large amounts of nuclear
materials are transported in this fuel cycle and
shipments appear especially vulnerable.
*The first reprocessing facility ceased operation in
1974 with the intention of resumption after enlarge-
ment of the West Valley, New York plant. Plutonium
has been stockpiled at the facility. Recently, the plant
was abandoned by the parent company leaving the
plutonium disposal problem in the hands of the State
or Federal government. At the present time, there is
no LWR plutonium recycling operation in the United
States, but another facility is planned in Illinois.
In assessing the safeguard ramifications of these
three nuclear fuel cycles, Willrich and Taylor have
developed scenarios relating annual production rates
for strategic nuclear materials to nine combinations
of reactor types in use. Quantities are highest when
the breeder is the predominant reactor and LWR
plutonium is recycled. Potential bomb equivalents
range from a low of 7,000 annually in 1 980 to a year
2000 high of 250,000. The estimated number of
plutonium truckloads to fuel fabrication plants varies
from 300 to 3000 annually depending on the amount
of plutonium recycling in the scenario. For all cases,
Willrich and Taylor project 1000 American nuclear
reactors, five to fifteen uranium enrichment plants,
twenty fuel fabrication plants, and twenty fuel
reprocessing plants in the year 2000. 26
Cochran estimates that 100 million kilograms of
plutonium will be in use by the year 2000. 27 He
assumes a hypothetical figure of plutonium residuals
to the environment from all sources including core
accidents, nuclear theft, transportation losses, and
natural disasters at a millionth of the stock in use.
Placing the cancer risk at 0.05 per person per
microcurie of plutonium 239 inhaled, Cochran es-
timates that 10 8 cancers would result. He admits that
his estimate may be high or low by a factor of one
thousand since the biosphere may provide a sink for
some plutonium, but food chain cycling may counter-
vail the effect. 27
Types of Safeguard Problems
Once nuclear material has been stolen, there are
three basic types of potential safeguard problems: the
construction of nuclear bombs, radiation dispersal
weapons, and the sabotage of nuclear facilities and
transportation shipments.
One of the frequently mentioned complications of
nuclear theft is the highly emotional issue of illicit
nuclear bombs. Can a bomb be constructed from
stolen SNM? How does the relative difficulty of
fabrication compare for the LMFBR and alternate fuel
cycles? How much material must be stolen to build an
explosive? Not surprisingly, these questions have not
been resolved.
Conflicting opinions abound. ERDA maintains,
"While it does not theoretically take extremely large
quantities of plutonium to manufacture a nuclear ex-
plosive, the process is not an easy or sure one to ac-
complish. The possibility of harm to the weapon
maker is high, as is the possibility that the potential
weapon would detonate prematurely with very minor
results."28
Terrorists are interested in crude fission bombs,
and therefore do not need to construct efficient, light-
weight missile warheads. Taylor suggests that one
person working alone could design and build a bomb
equivalent to 100 tons of explosives from ten
kilograms of reactor grade plutonium oxide. Such a
bomb could kill 100,000 people in an urbanized
area. 29 According to Kinderman, "the equipment re-
quirements would not be large ... a few tens of
27 Carolina planning
thousands of dollars of equipment properly in-
stalled." 30
Terrorist groups abletoaccumulatestrategicquan-
tities of plutonium but lacking explosive fabrication
expertise could conceivably kidnap or bribe someone
tohelpthem. Classified information and underground
handbooks on bomb construction are already
reputedly in circulation.
How risky is bomb fabrication to the terrorist?
Because of the toxicity of plutonium, it would be wise
to work with it behind an air-tight barrier to prevent
inhalation. Heavy shielding is not necessary because
most of the emissions are non-penetrating alpha
particles. A bomb maker working with U-233 stolen
from an HTGR fuel cycle facility would face larger
health risks from penetrating gamma rays.
How much nuclear material is needed to build a
bomb? One kilogram of plutonium 239 will not ex-
plode. A few neutrons will be undergoing fission, but
they will generally escape the surface of the material
without initiating further fissions. The amount of
SNM that must be present for explosive fission is
called the critical mass. It is sixteen kilograms for
plutonium 239 (delta phase) and fifty kilogramsfor U-
235. 31 Reflective metals such as beryllium can reduce
the required critical mass substantially.
Plutonium will be present in many different forms
in the various stages of the LMFBR cycle. Metallic
plutonium is best for bomb-making. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued guidelines
that in-transit plutonium should be in the oxide form
to minimize damage in case of a transportation acci-
dent. The oxide form requires no special processing
before use in a bomb core, but conversion to the pure
metal increases the efficiency of a bomb and is not
difficult. When plutonium is produced from U-238 in
a breeder or conventional reactor, it is reprocessed
into the nitrate form. Plutonium nitrate fissions too
slowly to be directly usable in a bomb; however, it isa
simple matter to transform it into the oxide form.
Spent breeder fuel assemblies contain relatively
large proportions of plutonium 240. If the 240 isotope
content is too high, the bomb may not fission or it may
predetonate, fizzling out without suddenly releasing
large amounts of radiation and energy. Yet,
technology is now being developed to separate Pu-
240 more easily.
In contrast, LWR fuel is enriched to only two or five
percent U-235 and it is not directly usable in a nuclear
bomb. U-238, the bulk of LWR fuel, will not sustain a
chain reaction in a bomb. Currently, the technology
for uranium enrichment is classified and complex.
The processes require huge amounts of electricity
and extensive facilities. Technology is in a constant
state of change and research is being done on a laser
method of uranium enrichment.
Another possible alternative, the HTGR, is suscep-
tible to nuclear theft for bomb construction purposes
at only two stages in its fuel cycle; during oxide con-
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version and fuel fabrication.
At the oxide conversion step, a thief would have to
accumulate "125 kilograms of material to have
enough uranium, after separation from the thorium,
for a crude fission bomb." 32
At fuel fabrication, HTGR uranium is enriched to
90-95 percent U-235. Despite the high enrichment
level, once this material has been fabricated into fuel
particles, it is not optimal bomb material. The U-235 is
considerably diluted by thorium; requiring extensive
chemical separation the HTGR fuel particle coatings
also impede exploitation. The graphite must be burn-
ed off; silicon carbide will not burn and is not acid
soluble. It must be crushed between rollers. A nuclear
theft of four tonnes of HTGR fuel would provide fif-
teen kilograms of usable high enriched uranium.
Before graphite coating and thorium combination, a
thief would still need 1500 kilograms of particles. 33
Radiation Dispersal Weapons
Stolen nuclear material, especially plutonium, can
be very useful to terrorists lacking sufficient quan-
tities for bomb construction. Plutonium could be
scattered in the wind in populous areas, thrown into
the water supply, or spread through buildings. Dis-
persal would claim a heavy toll in human life, property
damage, and land contamination. A timing device
could be used to release finely divided radioactive
particles from containment.
Decontamination costs would run in the millions of
dollars for a skyscraper. Outdoors, plutonium would
be diluted by fresh ambient air and swept away by tur-
bulence. However, it would be harder to contain the
pollutant, and environmental damage may be more
persistent outside. After settling on the ground, par-
ticles may re-enter the air or leach through the soil to
ground water. For rational or irrational reasons,
society may shun places victimized by radiological
dispersal, incurring opportunity costs. Microgram
quantities of plutonium could be placed in seemingly
empty envelopes and mailed as inhalation letter
bombs. Inhalation of uranium is relatively less harm-
ful. "Plutonium 239 in equilibrium with its daughters
has a direct radiological hazard about 10,000 time
that of natural uranium in equilibrium." 34 Still larger
quantities of the U-233 isotope product of HTGR's
would be needed to match the dispersal hazard
potential of plutonium.
The environmental impact statement on the LMF-
BR discounts the danger of radiological weapons, ter-
ming their use possible, but speculative. "Although
the potential consequences could be significant, they
would not approach the severity of a nuclear ex-
plosive. The use of radiological weapons does not
appear to be consistent with the observed behavior of
terrorists or extortionists." 36
In fact, although not quite as dramatic as a nuclear
bomb, radiological dispersal may have as much
emotional impact. Foreign nations are probably less
interested in radiological weapons because they can
be self-defeating if the desired objective is conquest
of agricultural land or special resources. Purely
political or ideological wars can be fought with disper-
sal weapons, but many other biological warfare tox-
ins are available and easier to use.
Nuclear Sabotage
Nuclear terrorism can take place without nuclear
theft. Sabotage is derived from the French word sabot
meaning a wooden shoe. A sabot strategically in-
serted in factory machinery very effectively gums up
the works. Successful nuclear sabotage is far more
worrisome. Armed groups could take over a reactor
and cause a deliberate malfunction. A sabotage-
induced incident would entail expensive repairs dur-
ing a long shut-down period with additional costs in
foregone output. Although the accidental Brown's
Ferry reactor fire was not a safeguards-related event,
it demonstrates the size of possible losses. Economic
cost exceeded £50,000,000 (one British pound is
approximately equal to 1.6 American dollars). 36
During a LMFBR core accident, released energy
may cause the liquid metal (sodium) coolant to boil.
"Plutonium could be scattered in the
wind in populous areas, thrown into
the water supply, or spread through
buildings."
Normally, sodium lowers the temperature, decreas-
ing the fission rate. Boiling sodium bubbles leave
voids or areasof open space where heatand neutrons
are not absorbed. This positive sodium void coef-
ficient propagates the uncontrolled chain reaction.
Released energy can further vaporize sodium, cause
melting and relocation of the cladding and fuel core,
and break apart mechanical reactor features. Webb
estimated that because of runaway reactivity, a
nuclear reactor explosion may be equivalent to as
much as 20,000 pounds of TNT. 37
Ralph Nader disputes ERDA's Rasmussen report
findings on accident results. He quotes the American
Physicist Society's projection that, "A reactor acci-
dent would cause 1 0,000 to 20,000 deaths, 22,000 to
350,000 injuries, 3,000 to 20,000 genetic deaths,
plus widespread and enduring land con-
tamination." 38
Willrich and Taylor are less pessimistic on the
sabotage issue because reactor safety designs are in-
teded to minimize susceptibility to natural and man-
made disasters and to contain any accidents that
might occur. They conclude that bombing a reactor
core to destruction would be less dangerous than
constructing a low yield fission bomb.
Transportation and the Safeguard
Issue
Transportation may be the most vulnerable link in
the chain of safeguards. Scenarios dependent on the
LMFBR, or to a lesser extent the LWR with plutonium
recycle, mandate the shipment of large amounts of
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strategic nuclear material. Projected data on the
number of shipments and their contents is available
for the Clinch River prototype breeder. There will be
84 to 106 annual shipments directly attributable to
this single reactor operating at sub-commercial
levels. 1 250 kilograms of plutonium oxide, enough for
100 fission bombs will be shipped each year from the
Clinch River prototype. NRC estimates shipping dis-
tances at from 500-1000 miles. 39 ERDA's risk deter-
mination for transportation in the LMFBR impact
statement was based solely on assumptions and
judgment. The EPA was unable to conclude that ex-
isting transport cask designs are adequate under ac-
tual accident conditions. ERDA made no attempt to
predict risk from theft or sabotage of shipments.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has no
jurisdiction over common carriers to avoid entering
the domain of the Department of Transportation and
the Interstate Commerce Commission. NRC can only
directly set standards for nuclear facilities. It would be
difficult to requi re secruity clearance for employees of
common carriers.
Truck shipments are the most susceptible to diver-
sion of SNM. Trucks are allowed to carry non-nuclear
cargo along with SNM shipments, provided that no
extra stops are made before discharging the nuclear
cargo. Trucks should be monitored closely to insure
adherence to the planned route
Railroad cars are more difficult to hijack. On the other
hand, no special design requirements pertain to
trains and there are no restriction on stops and
storage methods. It is difficult to plan ahead against
theft conspiracy by railroad employees.
As for air transport, we must be prepared to prevent
skyjacking and theft by employees or agents disguis-
ed as employees. There are currently no special
"Transportation
vulnerable link
safeguards."
may be
in the
the most
chain of
regulations for the physical protection of air
shipments or for guard-escorts. The Institute of
Nuclear Materials Management notes, "The inability
of the air industry to properly handle the cargo hand-
ed to it for air carriage now approaches a national
scandal."40 Air shipments are often combined with
trucking of SNM from the airport to the destination.
Places of transfer or mode changes as well as
warehouses must be carefully safeguarded. So far,
there have been 300 reported accidents in transpor-
tation of radioactive materials. NRC claims no deaths
or injuries resulted. "Accidents" can also be made to
occur deliberately by intentional destruction of
mechanical parts. A terrorist could also attack or
bombard a shipment of nuclear materials. Transpor-
tation modes do not have the sophisticated design
containment devices and barriers which help protect
nuclear facilities. Although the quantity of SNM at
stake is smaller, for a given shipment, the amounts
are not strategically insignificant. The AEC projected
9,500 spent fuel shipments in the year 2000, with a
mean distance of 500 miles or a total of 4,750,000
vehicle-miles. Fifty percent of these would be from
LMFBR fuel cycle needs. Weinberg's counter-
estimate is 12,000,000 vehicle miles traveled. 41
Nuclear shipments by any mode should be protected
by armed, trained guards. Travel routes and speed
should be carefully observed and back up force
available.
What are the effects of a transportation "ac-
cident"? NRC's estimates are based on theirexpecta-
tion that the fuel cladding on unirradiated fuel
assemblies will remain intact should the inner and
outer containers be breached. Even a small break in
the inner container could cause coolant loss spilling
the entire contents of fuel rods as further breaks open
up. NRC admits the severity of such an event, but con-
siders the probability "incredible".
Safeguard Lapses
Industrial and governmental advocates of the LMF-
BR program who cite the generally good safety record
of the nuclear industry in the past are naively attemp-
ting to justify extrapolations into the future. Nuclear
power is becoming de-mystified as knowledge about
its capabilities and limitations becomes more
widespread. In a future predicated on a plutonium
fuel cycle, vastly increased amounts of this element
not found naturally on earth will be circulating across
the country. Criminals and terrorists will gain
awareness of their opportunities to take advantage of
new technology.
Overall, the past record of the nuclear industry has
been satisfactory. Nevertheless, there have been a
number of serious lapses in nuclear safeguards. Most
have not been given wide publicity. Edward Teller
commented, "So far we have been extremely lucky.
But with the spread of industrialization, with the
greater number of simians monkeying around with
things they do not completely understand, sooner or
later a fool will prove greater than the proof even in a
foolproof system."42
Carl Walske, former Assistant Defense Secretary
for Atomic Energy Matters in 1974 Congressional
testimony, stated that, "3600 employees with access
to nuclear weapons or materials were replaced in one
year because of alcoholism, mental illness, drug
abuse, and disciplinary problems." 43
Can the human element ever be eliminated as a risk
factor? A serious lapse in safeguards occurred at the
Kerr-McGee fuel production plant in Oklahoma.
Large quantities of plutonium were reported missing
and one employee, Karen Silkwood, died under
mysterious circumstances. The Nuclear Energy
Uability-Property Insurance Association is one of two
pools underwriting nuclear policies. It has made 30
claim payments since 1 957. None of these accidents
occurred at power plants; most were transportation-
related. The incidents include a $300,000 settlement
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to the estate of a cancer victim who was con-
taminated by plutonium at a truck terminal in 1963
andthe 1975 loss of contaminated reactor filters after
the boxes fell off a truck. The filters laterturnedupina
police "lost and found".
Safeguard Methods
There are four main purposes of a safeguards
program: 1) to prevent diversion of nuclear material,
2) to detect deversion after its occurrence, 3) to
recover lost material safely, and 4) in the event of a
failure in the first three objectives to establish a
scenario for protection of human welfare and
minimization of environmental damage.
The Federal government and the nuclear power in-
dustry should work together with the scientific com-
munity and the public to develop a comprehensive
safeguard system. Federal authority is currentlyfrac-
tionated. EPA urges a more clear-cut delineation of
responsibility between ERDA and NRC. The AEC ad-
mitted in 1974, "Almost no standards exist in the
materials protection area and in many cases the basic
data needed to develop such standards have not been
developed."44
We are now spending less than 10,000,000 dollars
a year on safeguards. Hardly any research has been
done in the area of stolen material recovery. ERDA is
conducting a threat definition study to examine the
uses of stolen nuclear material and the
characteristics of possible perpetrators. The study
should be complete in 1978. ERDA is also funding a
small amount of research in computerized material
monitoring. The agency will make a decision on the
safeguards-acceptability of commercial LMFBR's in
the early 1980's.
What are some of the methods used in a safeguard
system? Strategic Nuclear Material accountancy is
supposed to show if safeguards are working properly.
It cannot prevent nuclear theft, but in the ideal case it
serves as a deterrent by increasing the possibility of
apprehending the culprit and capturing the material.
In reality, there is a long time lag between theft and
discovery. The acceptable limit of error in measure-
ment for SIMM at a reprocessing plant will represent a
large amount of unaccounted for material. There is
also a large amount of material located in the in-
accessible parts of machinery and reactor cores.
Edward Teller is concerned, ' I don't think anybody
can foresee where one or two or five percent of the
plutonium will find itself."45 The nuclear industry
hopes for some improvements in on-line non-
destructive assay techniques so that lag times can be
reduced.
Many measures serving as safeguards are design-
ed for routine physical protection. These safety
methods include radiation shielding, containment to
prevent criticality and allow heat dissipation, entry
and exit controls, storage vaults, and foundations and
barriers designed for maintaining stability in the
event of earthquakes and other natural phenomena.
Other measures have been developed for security
purposes. Security plans are not available to the
public for obvious reasons. The development of portal
radiation monitors and conventional explosive
monitors could greatly improve a safeguard system.
An alarm system could be coordinated with
mechanized physical barriers and could alert the
security force. A security force in conjunction with
the rest of a safeguard system should be designed to
control the "maximum credible" set of adverse cir-
cumstances. The question of government versus
private responsibility for safeguard controls and costs
has not been settled. ERDA is studying the possibility
of a Federal nuclear guard force.
Alvin Weinberg urges creation of a "nuclear
priesthood", a technocratic elite, which may be
governmental or private, dedicated to the
maintenance of security. Ordinary police forces may
not appreciate the danger or may be unable to cope
with system complexities. A "nuclear priesthood"
may have some undesirable consequences. The FEA
warns that, "There shouldbe consideration of the im-
pacts on society . . . since safeguarding against
plutonium theft is basically an insoluble problem
without putting the whole nuclear energy system un-
der military controls.
"46
Britain's Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution warns that the "use of informers, in-
filtrators, wiretapping, checking on bank accounts,
andthe opening of mail . . . are highly likely and in-
deed inevitable" in an LMFBR economy. 47
Finally, if society were willing to pay the price of
possible loss of democratic values, how effective
would the safeguard system be? According to Willrich
and Taylor, "The quality of effort would be well
beyond what the public normally expects from the law
enforcement authorities in crime prevention, or even
in the theft of large amounts of money."48 Some
serious lapses will undoubtedly occur.
Changes in fuel composition also have a large bear-
ing on nuclear safeguards. The "cooldown" method
is a way to change the composition of spent nuclear
fuel without altering the fuel input. The LMFBR burns
fuel at high specific power* favoring the formation of
intense, short-lived radionuclides. For this reason,
dispersal of spent LMFBR fuel carries a larger danger.
Certain of these radioactive elements with high
biological potentials decay to significantly lower con-
centrations with the passage of time. Weinberg
suggests cooldown for a 360 day period before ship-
ment to cut heat generated in shipping casks of spent
fuel by a factor of six. By comparison, ERDA cost
calculations in the environmental statement are bas-
ed on a 30 day cooldown period. Cooldown is cost-
ly; it decreases the plutonium doubling time. It has
been estimated that there is a loss of usable radioac-
tive material of eighteen dollars per kilogram per
month of waiting time. 49 That does not include ad-
ditional costs associated with storage and inventory.
It is also possible to increase the danger to nuclear
thieves by adding gamma emitters to fresh or spent
fuel. Unfortunately, that may backfire and increase
* Specific Power equals watts per pound.
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the risks to the public. ERDA is also studying the
possibility of poisoning unauthorizedfissioning bythe
addition of isotopes which make it more difficult to
construct bombs with large explosive potentials.
Alternately, the chemical or physical forms might be
altered to reduce toxicity in the event of dispersal. The
most drastic fuel changes would be to reject the LMF-
BR fuel cycle and to avoid LWR plutonium recycle
despite the economic incentives.
Safeguard risks may also be reduced by siting
techniques. For example, co-location of some or all
stagesof fuel cycle facilities is recommended by EPA
as a way to "greatly reduce the risk that a nuclear
shipment between two facilities might be hijacked
and also results in substantial savings in transporta-
tion costs to the enterprise." 60 A clustering of
facilities into nuclear "parks", would also concen-
trate the problems of thermal pollution and suscep-
tibility to natural and man-made disasters. Co-
location is expensive in terms of foregone economies
of scale since there would be a larger number of
smaller fuel cycle facilities. Teller suggests location of
reactors and facilities underground or underwater.
The Costs of Safeguards
Fortunately, the costs of pre-planned safeguards
may not be unreasonable. Willrich and Taylor, critics
of the meager controls originally anticipated, are op-
timistic. "It may appear . . . that the development and
application of a system of safeguards that will keep
the risks of nuclear theft very low indeed will result in
enormous costs . . this is not the case for a safeguard
system which employs the best available technology
and institutional mechanisms." 51
Spokesmen from ERDA, NRC, the Joint Con-
gressional Economics Committee, Westinghouse,
and General Electric concur that the marginal cost of
preplanned safeguards will be small relative to
nuclear power expenditures, on the order of 1 percent
to 2 percent of total nuclear costs. The exact
magnitude is a matter of guesswork until firm
regulations and requirments are set.
Because people are not currently aware of the
magnitude of the problem, the political centers of
power are not moving very quickly on the safeguard
issue. In a 1976 report, the Government Accounting
Office (GAO) found many safeguard deficiencies at
ERDA contractor facilities and pointed out the need
for "additional guards, alarms, doorway detectors,
night vision devices, and improved communication
equipment." But Congress appropriated less than
half of the administration's 1 976 request to upgrade
contractor safeguards. ERDA has been allocated only
2.1 million dollars in fiscal 1976 to improve in-
struments measuring nuclear material. 52
Conclusions
The safeguards issue is by no means resolved.
Many questions are still unanswered. The probability
of safeguard circumvention is very real, although as
yet undertermined, due to uncertainty and the in-
choate nature of safeguard planning. Various groups
and individuals have expressed their own opinions
about safeguard feasibility and the proper course of
action for the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor
program.
EPA was unable to conclude "on the basis of the in-
formation presented in the PFES* that commercial
development of the LMFBR program can be ac-
complished without causing future unacceptable en-
vironmental impacts." 53
The Scientist's Institute for Public Information
denigrates the role of future technological im-
provements, "The advance of knowledge does not
necessarily show the risks of LMFBR's to be smaller
than ignorance or prudence would have thought
them." 54
The Rand Corporation concludes that due to the
large amount of uncertainty surrounding the
program, the LMFBR should be developed in an
"austere, incremental sequential" manner, "with
adequate time for testing and evaluation." 55
A number of observers urge greater flexibility in an
energy program to avoid excessive dependence on
any single generation method. Edward Teller allows
for the possibility that the "LMFBR will become the
most useful reactor," but he stipulates that, "Claims
to the effect that sooner or later the LMFBR will
become unavoidable are unproven." 56 The Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution urged post-
ponement of the plutonium fuel economy for as long
as possible while other alternatives are being
developed. Willrich and Taylor are concerned, yet
more optimistic, "Obviously, there is no perfect solu-
tion to the problem of nuclear theft any more than
there is a final solution to the problem of crime. But
there are safeguards which if implemented, will
reduce the risk ... to a very low level, a level which, in
our opinion, is acceptable." 57
What should be done? Decision criteria and
assumptions should be chosen conservatively
because of the magnitude of potential risks and the
lack of scientific consensus. Impartial research
should be stepped up and public participation and
debate should be encouraged. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission has two major efforts un-
derway, a "Special Safeguards Study" on re-
quirements and a report on the possible creation of a
quasi-autonomous agency within NRC, the "Security
Agency Study". ERDA is concentrating on threat
definition and experimentation and demonstration of
safeguard procedures.
These studies will not be complete until 1980-
1982. It would therefore be reasonable for the
government to hold down LMFBR operational
development funds until these other issues are
resolved. At any rate, some action should be taken
now. Answers cannot be pushed off into the vague
future: planning is preferable to procrastination.
Critics hope that ERDA will be able to live up to its
promise that the "safeguards program will be design-
ed to attain a level of protection to the public which
*Proposed Final Environmental Statement
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would not increase significantly the overall risk ot
death, injury, or property damage from causes beyond
the control of the individual." 58
Likewise, it would be a futile self-fulfilling prophecy
if other energy forms do not become feasible simply
because the lion's share of research and develop-
ment are channelled to the LMFBR, locking us into a
single technology.
The plutonium safeguards problem has received lit-
tle public attention. Few people are even aware of
what an LMFBR is. Because this is an important
public policy issue, the social decisions should be
made by an informed populace.
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